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Information security policies as apparatus for 
communicating security principles with employees are 
the cornerstone of organizational information security. 
Resultantly, extant literature has looked at different 
theories to better understand the noncompliance 
problem. Neutralization theory is emerging as one of the 
most popular approaches, not only as an explanation 
but also as a solution. In this in-depth qualitative study, 
we ask the question ‘how do employees justify violating 
the ISP’? Our findings reveal nine rationalizing 
techniques, three of which have not been recognized in 
previous research. We label them ‘I follow my own 
rules’, ‘matter of mere legality’ and ‘defense of 
uniqueness’. But more importantly, our in-depth 
insights point to the danger of taking these 
rationalizations out of context, since without context, it 
becomes impossible to judge whether the behavior or 
the rule, needs correcting, reflecting a dilemma 
recognized in the original writing of neutralization 
theory, which has since been forgotten.   
1. Introduction  
With increasing reliance of organizations on cyber 
environments for managing their daily operations, 
protection of information assets in such environments 
becomes ever more crucial. Various threat 
classifications have been introduced [1], of which 
threats emanating from employees (i.e. insider threat) is 
considered “the greatest threat to information security” 
[2]. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged among scholars 
of information systems security (hereafter, ISS) that 
information security policy (hereafter, ISP) and its 
enforcement constitute the foundation of an 
organization’s information security [3], [4]. In most 
behavioral ISS research, ISP reflects low-level policies 
which contains “normative lists of actions that the 
employees should (or should not) perform” [3]. 
Formally, these normative lists of actions, or rules, are 
the ultimate authoritative voice against which 
employees are held accountable. Considering the critical 
role that ISPs could play in ensuring the security of 
organizational information assets, many ISS scholars 
have emphasized that policy enforcement should be 
non-negotiable, and that “an unenforced policy is not 
worth the paper it is written on” [5]. It would be safe to 
argue that solving the ISP noncompliance problem has 
become the mantra of mainstream ISS research. 
Neutralization theory [6] is emerging as a popular lens 
in ISS research [7]–[9], especially that it has the 
capacity to double both as an explanation and solution 
to the noncompliance problem. As an explanation, 
neutralization theory is used to demonstrate that 
employees apply various rationalizations (aka 
neutralization techniques) in order to liberate 
themselves from normative restrictions, thereby making 
policy violations easier to justify [4]. Current ISS 
research provides evidence in line with this argument 
[10]–[12]. As a solution, neutralization theory is used to 
devise training programs tailored to the specific 
techniques with the aim of de-neutralizing them [13], 
[14].  
Despite these extremely important insights into 
employees’ use of neutralizations and the proposed 
solutions, it is surprising to find that very little has been 
done to hear the employees’ voices regarding the 
justifiability of ISP violations committed in the specific 
context of their work environment. Furthermore, as of 
yet, there is little evidence to suggest that ISS 
researchers have considered the possibility that ISP, 
rather than employees’ neutralizations, needs 
correcting. After all, research in criminology has 
recognized that ‘not all neutralizations are bad’ [15, p. 
228]. If this is the case in the ISS context as well, then 
we might be missing crucial insights if all employees’ 
insights are dismissed as (bad) neutralizations.  
Lack of understanding of the context of violation 
may lead to the adoption of ‘no-justification-allowed’ 
approach, which would be problematic in situations 
where even justifiable reasons for violating an ISP rule 
would be reported as ‘making excuses’ [16], when the 
correct course of action would have been a modification 
in the security measure and its corresponding policy. 
Research of this nature is inherently qualitative, which 
is currently lacking and much needed [17], [18]. Given 
this research gap, in this article we report our findings 
from an in-depth qualitative study [19], [20]. In 
conducting this study, not only have we gained insights 





that extends neutralization theory through the 
identification of novel techniques, but also, we 
demonstrate that employees’ justifications for policy 
violation are context-dependent and in some cases may 
point our attention to flaws in the rules, rather than in 
the behavior.  
2. Theoretical background 
Information security policy (ISP) is recognized as 
the foundation of organizational information security 
since it communicates to the employees what they can 
and cannot do with the organization’s assets [3]. 
Therefore, understanding of employees’ ISP 
(non)compliance behavior has become one of the major 
concerns for information security researchers [4], [13], 
[14], [21]. In this domain, neutralization theory [6], [22] 
is emerging as a popular lens to examine how employees 
justify violating workplace ISPs. Neutralization theory 
[6] was introduced to explain how delinquents, 
especially those in the early stages of their criminal 
career, deploy various techniques that enable them to 
drift between the worlds of the law-abiding citizen, and 
that of a delinquent. Sykes and Matza [6] identified five 
such techniques and called them neutralizations 
techniques. These are, ‘denial of responsibility’, ‘denial 
of injury’, ‘denial of victim’, ‘condemnation of 
condemners’, and ‘appeal to higher loyalties’.  
Each of these techniques provides a 
counterargument (hence the name, neutralization) to 
rationalize or justify the deviant behavior from the 
offender’s point-of-view. The ‘denial of responsibility’ 
technique is used to liberate oneself from any sense of 
accountability and control with respect to the situation 
at hand, by arguing, for example, that “I didn’t mean it” 
[6, p. 669]. ‘Denial of injury’ provides a rationalization 
that diminishes the impact of the act, whereby the 
offender would claim, for example, that “I didn’t really 
hurt anybody” [ibid]. The ‘denial of the victim’ 
technique involves a confrontational argument denying 
the existence of a victim in the first place, suggesting 
that the victim deserved what happened and that “they 
had it coming” [ibid]. The ‘condemnation of the 
condemners’ is a technique by which the offender turns 
the spotlight on those who disapprove of the activity to 
undermine them usually by arguing that “everybody is 
picking on me” [ibid]. Lastly, the offender might 
‘appeal to higher loyalties’ and argue that engaging in 
the offense is out of loyalty to groups such as family or 
friends and it is not due to lack of respect for norms of 
the society at large, for example, “I didn’t do it for 
myself” [ibid]. Later research in criminology has 
unearthed further techniques that offenders could 
deploy to neutralize anti-social behavior. ‘Metaphor of 
the ledger’ [23], ‘defense of necessity’ [24],  ‘claim of 
individuality’ [25]  ‘justification by comparison’,  
‘justification by postponement’ [26], ‘claim of 
entitlement’ [27], ‘everybody does it’ [27], and ‘claim 
of relative acceptability’ [25] are among the techniques 
that have been developed in addition to the initial five 
techniques.   
In the ISS field, neutralization theory has been used 
to explain deviance in two main research themes. The 
first theme covers workplace deviance committed by 
employees. Under the workplace deviance theme, two 
distinct topics have dominated this area of research: one 
explores the justifiability of crimes committed by 
employees, such as hacking and stealing [28], [29]; and 
the other explores non-criminal violations of 
organizational policy, such as, cyberloafing [12], [30] 
and shadow IT use [11], [31]. The second research 
theme, in turn, covers deviant behavior outside of 
organizational context, which explores the justifiability 
of software and music piracy [32]–[34]. To date, 
however, neutralization-based ISS research design has 
been predominantly confirmatory in nature, aiming to 
test the extent to which one or more neutralization 
techniques is significantly associated with a given 
violation. In this regard, multiple studies provide 
evidence that neutralization techniques could increase 
one’s intention to engage in ISP violation in general [8], 
[35]–[37], commit computer abuse [29], [38], use the 
workplace Internet for personal purposes [30], [39], [40] 
as well as engage in shadow IT use [11]. Furthermore, 
some studies suggest that deploying neutralization 
techniques may discourage employees from complying 
with ISP [10], [41], [42]. While these studies generally 
focus on testing the extent to which neutralization is 
significantly associated with a given violation; more 
recent research has started devising neutralization 
theory-based solutions to ISP violations. One such 
solution is communicating anti-neutralization messages 
[13], [14]. For instance, a message targeting ‘denial of 
injury’ would stress that “there is always the possibility 
for harm” [13]. Results from two studies that examined 
the mitigating effect of anti-neutralization messages 
showed that users who received such messages were 
more likely to be discouraged from ISP violation 
compared to those who did not receive any 
communication messages [13], [16]. Another solution 
that has been investigated for neutralization prevention 
is anti-neutralization training [14]. After conducting a 
training program targeting users’ neutralization of 
password policy violation, Siponen et al. [14] reported 
that overall the training programs based on cognitive 
dissonance reduced neutralization even though training 
might have been ineffective for specific techniques such 
as, ‘claim of entitlement’, ‘claim of relative 
acceptability’ and ‘Justification by comparison’. 
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Despite the very important insights we gain from 
these studies, it is surprising to find that we lack context-
specific and data-driven (i.e., inductive) research [43]–
[45] that aims to understand how employees, in their 
own words, rationalize and justify ISP violations 
committed in their workplace. The only exception is 
Lim and Teo [46] whose work on cyberloafing 
recognized the importance of the ‘shifting work home’ 
phenomenon. Beyond this single effort, no attempt has 
been made to probe the violator’s worldview. Such 
explorative approach, not only does it offer evidence of 
the applicability (or lack thereof) of neutralization 
theory in different contexts, but also it offers a unique 
opportunity to discover new neutralization techniques 
specific to ISP violations. 
3. Research approach  
The study reported here is based on a qualitative 
inquiry [19], [20] conducted between 2016 and 2018, 
with the general aim of understanding the employees’ 
perspective regarding the role ISP plays in guiding their 
everyday work routines, in the context of a large 
research-oriented Nordic university. Several calls have 
been made to conduct such research in the ISS field to 
complement the dominant functional view, which 
generally favors “normative logic and predictive 
capacity” [47], at the expense of understanding what 
employees actually do in real life settings [17], [18]. In 
balance, in this research we explore how the 
neutralization theory lens could help us better 
understand the employees’ information security 
noncompliance behavior. Hence, our approach 
emphasizes the examination of a phenomenon in its 
naturalistic context, with the purpose of confronting 
theory with the empirical world [48], [49]. Not only 
does our research approach support the understanding of 
a phenomenon in its natural setting, but also it advocates 
adopting neutralization theory as a sensitizing device to 
ensure that we enter the research setting with an ‘open’–
rather than ‘empty’–mind [50]. Research based on 
neutralization theory acknowledges the subjective 
interpretive nature of neutralizations, and that there can 
be multiple interpretations for the same event and the 
justifications used within. Maruna and Copes [15] notes: 
“Every event is subject to multiple interpretations … 
[O]ne person's rational explanation is another's 
rationalization. If neutralizations are to carry any 
psychological weight, they must, at least partially, be 
believed by the person using them” [15, p. 230]. With 
this emphasis, we wish to highlight that in our analysis 
and identification of the neutralization techniques, we 
do not treat them as ‘lies’ or ‘deceptions’; rather as mere 
justifications.  
In terms of data collection, this study builds on 
multiple data sources including formal interviews, 
informal discussions, official documents (e.g., the 
official information security policy), as well as personal 
observation. Regarding the interviews, scheduled 
interviews were conducted with eighteen participants 
between October 2016 and September 2018. The 
participants were all on the payroll, and held various 
positions in the organization, including, administration 
staff, teacher, doctoral candidate, post-doctoral 
researcher, and professor. All interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, and on average, each lasted for 
one hour. All interviews were recorded, and the 
interviewees were promised anonymity, so they will be 
referred to in this study as “Interviewee # …”. All 
recorded interviews were treated with utmost care, and 
to ensure anonymity they were transcribed and 
anonymized by the first author alone. Then the 
transcribed text was shared with the second author for 
further analysis. Interviews were semi-structured [51], 
and the main themes revolved around each participant’s 
perception of and attitude towards the workplace ISP, to 
gain an in-depth understanding of its role in shaping 
their personal day-to-day computer use behavior. As 
such, the interview protocol was designed to elicit 
insights about the employees’ perception of ISPs in 
general, as well as about specific security behaviors 
[52]. General perceptions about ISP reflected questions 
such as to what extent they were aware of the official 
ISP, what it meant to them in the workplace, and how 
they felt ISP impacted their daily routines at work. 
Specific questions, on the other hand, focused more on 
discussing the participant’s views of specific rules as 
stated in the ISP (e.g., password change rule and 
personal IT use rule), to what extent they comply or 
violate these specific rules, and in the case of violation 
what they considered the best course of action to fix the 
situation. During each interview, the official ISP (either 
a printout or onscreen) was used to facilitate the 
discussion.  
All interview transcripts were coded using both 
first- and second-order themes [53] Specifically, first-
order codes are more reflective of the empirical data and 
represent as close as possible the narratives as generated 
by the participants themselves. By contrast, second-
order codes are more analytic in nature as they reflect 
the analysts’ interpretation of these concepts, which in 
our case, are influenced by the theoretical lens of 
neutralization. For instance, we consider the code 
‘ISP_is_Stupid’ to be first-order code since it reflects 
the participant’s utterance. Subsequently, we code the 
same utterance using the second-order code 
‘Condemnation_of_the_Condemners’, which is 
consistent with neutralization theory. This process 
allowed categorizing the violation justifications 
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according to known neutralization techniques, as well as 
identifying new justifications. The two authors 
discussed all resultant techniques in various meetings 
until a final agreement was achieved. 
4. Findings  
This section reports the main findings regarding the 
research question: ‘how do employees justify violating 
the ISP’? Due to space limitation we decided to report 
only our findings regarding neutralization techniques 
that are used by at least one-third of the participants. 
With this in mind, our analysis reveals the prevalence of 
nine neutralization techniques used by our participants 
to justify their ISP violations. Three of these techniques 
are classical and are well-known in the literature since 
they originate in Sykes and Matza’s [6] work. Namely, 
‘denial of responsibility’, ‘condemnation of the 
condemners’, and ‘denial of injury’. Three technique 
have been further developed by criminologists and are 
somewhat known in various ISS writings. Namely, 
‘defense of necessity’, ‘justification by comparison’, 
and the ‘everybody does it’ claim. Finally, we introduce 
three novel techniques specific to ISP violations that are 
not recognized in previous work. Namely, ‘matter of 
mere legality’, ‘defense of uniqueness’, and ‘I follow 
my own rules’. We discuss each of these categories in 
turn. 
1. Denial of responsibility. The ‘denial of 
responsibility’ technique is the most applied technique 
for policy violation in our study. Sykes and Matza [6] 
explain that ‘denial of responsibility’ allows delinquents 
to liberate themselves from normative restrictions by 
negating personal accountability. In this sense, 
employees who use the ‘denial of responsibility’ 
technique could argue that they were not in control of 
the situation, rather, they were acted upon by other 
responsible actors [26]. Fourteen participants used this 
technique. The use of this neutralization technique 
among our interviewees came to light when they were 
introduced with a copy of the official policy, at which 
point many of them realized that they had not seen it 
before or did not remember its content. Moreover, some 
went further to argue that no one stopped them from 
violating the policy and therefore they were not to be 
blamed. Meanwhile, others wished that someone else 
would take the burden of understanding and 
summarizing the ISP on their behalf. In general, the 
prevalence of this technique suggests that the 
interviewees see that it is not their responsibility to exert 
an effort on searching for the organization’s ISP and 
study its content. One interviewee sums up the use of 
this technique: “I think the main responsibility lies in 
the upper persons working in their office. I think it's the 
ones who make the policy should make sure everybody 
knows about it and knows about the different steps. I 
think if, for example, you start working for the 
university, people should tell you how to do, and you 
should not try to find things yourself, because there are 
millions of things that you have to learn about. Then I 
wouldn't put the responsibility on the employee, it's the 
responsibility of the employer to tell their employees 
that this is the policy to follow. So, I think the 
responsibility somewhere higher than on the average 
worker here.”  [Interviewee #11]. 
2. Condemnation of the condemners. The 
‘condemnation of the condemners’ neutralization 
technique enables an offender to shift the blame from 
oneself to those who disapprove of the action [6]. When 
deploying this technique an offender may claim that 
those who disapprove of the action are hypocrites who 
themselves commit the offense [6]. In criminal research, 
deploying this neutralization technique suggests that the 
offender views the enforcer as corrupt [26]. In ISS 
context, this technique often reflects disapproval of the 
ISP as being unreasonable [8], or that those who enforce 
IT policy may themselves engage in similar behavior 
[31]. In line with the common interpretation in ISS 
research, we find that thirteen participants used this 
technique. We observed the ‘condemnation of the 
condemners’ neutralization technique clearly reflected a 
criticism towards the ISP itself as being ‘outdated’, 
‘lame’, ‘ridiculous’ and even ‘stupid’. For instance, one 
participant believes that the policy section related to 
personal IT use “doesn't make too much sense, because 
all the things that I do on daily basis are somewhat 
related to private use” [Interviewee #16]. Similarly, 
others would think that this rule is “kind of old fashion” 
and it could have made more sense if it was introduced 
“five or ten years back” [Interviewee #6]. In addition to 
condemning the rules within the policy, some have also 
criticized those responsible for introducing those 
impractical rules in the policy in the first place. For 
instance, Interviewee #15 criticized the management 
style and what managers do with their time when the 
outcome is a policy such as this one. They note: “But 
these are the issues that I never understood. Maybe 
we're having too many bosses. Too many high salary 
people who do not have anything better to do. Yeah. But 
that's the way it is.” [Interviewee #15].  
3. Denial of injury. Using the ‘denial of injury’ 
technique allows an offender to render their action as 
harmless [6]. Since there is no harm, the offender could 
argue that the behavior is not blame-worthy. In 
criminology, the ‘denial of injury’ neutralization 
technique reflects the common argument that, for 
instance, a shoplifter could argue that big stores make a 
lot of money so ‘they don’t miss the little bit I get’ [26]. 
Similarly, In ISS context, employees may deploy ‘denial 
of injury’ by justifying that their security violation is a 
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minor issue and does not hurt anyone [16]. In the study 
at hand, thirteen interviewees used this technique. The 
use of ‘denial of injury’ neutralization technique was 
evident when interviewees directly noted that their 
policy violations were harmless. Generally, many 
interviewees regarded the role of ISP to be suggestive at 
best, and that violating it is acceptable as long as no 
harm is done. “… somehow the policies are drawing the 
boundary, so as long as people, kind of, within the 
boundary, or somehow a little beyond the boundary but, 
it doesn't really harm the security of those IT resources, 
or it doesn't really dramatically create negative impact 
on job performance, then I think it's somehow ok” 
[Interviewee #5]. When interviewees were asked to 
elaborate their views further using the specific example 
of the personal IT use rule, some took a productivity 
perspective and clarified that violating it is acceptable 
since “there's no harm except the work time lost that I 
can make up by working a bit later, or working at home 
when the kids are in bed.” [Interviewee #17]. Others, 
however, took a purely financial perspective and 
justified rule breaking on the basis of the economic 
impact of the violation: “unless there's something I 
don't know about, I mean, it doesn't cost any more 
money, does it? … Is there a loss of money to the 
university for me looking at a holiday website in my 
lunch break?” [Interviewee #10].  
4. Defense of necessity. The ‘defense of necessity’ 
neutralization technique holds that an offense is 
necessary to achieve a crucial outcome (Coleman, 
1987). Consequently, since the offense is necessary and 
the offender has no other choice, there is no need for 
feeling guilty or ashamed [24], [26]. In criminal 
research, thieves for example would use the ‘defense of 
necessity’ technique to argue that stealing was the only 
way to feed the family [26]. In ISS context, employees 
may deploy this technique by arguing that due to time 
constraints, violation of the ISP is necessary for 
completing their tasks [8]. In the current study, half of 
the interviewees appealed to this technique.  The 
‘defense of necessity’ was evident in arguments 
whereby compliance with the ISP was framed as an 
obstacle to efficiency, or a secondary priority in the face 
of the pressing demands of work requirements. Talking 
about the ISP in general, several interviewees advanced 
arguments similar to this one: “So, security and 
complying with the policy is secondary in priorities 
compared to the primary things that needs to be done; 
what I'm here to do.” [Interviewee #11]. When asked to 
elaborate their rationale, one interviewee gives further 
explanation: “I mean it is like, if you follow this 100% 
[pointing to the personal IT use rule], you couldn't visit 
any webpage with your work computer,  for example, 
that are not 100% related to work. Then you would all 
the time have to carry 2 computers with you. And then if 
you have a browser open in one computer, then you 
would have to open the other one and open a browser 
there just to visit, for example, one page. So, it would be 
a lot of hassle, a lot of extra work, and in the end, I think 
it would also be detrimental to your work effectiveness.” 
[Interviewee #11]. 
5. Justification by comparison. The idea behind 
the ‘justification by comparison’ technique is quite 
simple, by arguing that the violation in question is much 
better than a much worse violation. When deploying this 
technique, an offender acknowledges that they are 
engaging in a wrongdoing but justifies their action by 
arguing that they could have done worse. In criminal 
research, shoplifters for instance would argue that 
stealing from a shop is nothing compared to robbing 
people or breaking in houses [26]. In ISS research, 
‘justification by comparison’ has received little research 
attention, however, a user can utilize this technique by 
arguing that an ISP violation, such as violating password 
policy, is not as bad as wasting the whole day on non-
productive work [14]. Nearly half of our participants 
(eight interviewees) used this technique, when 
comparing their own (little) ISP violations with what 
would be considered (truly) serious violations, such as 
“downloading movies” [Interviewee #12], “watching 
pornography” [Interviewee #9], or even “bitcoin 
mining” [Interviewee #17]. Interestingly, there seems to 
be a general agreement on comparing ISP violations 
against what would be clearly interpreted as a harmful 
or illegal, to justify own violations. One interviewee 
elaborates their perspective: “if students were running 
peer-to-peer networking at [online service]. So, that's a 
clear violation. It's illegal activity. So, that goes beyond 
the threshold. At that point, yellow card. But, obviously, 
using Facebook, e-commerce, online banking, doesn't 
go beyond the threshold of me to get a warning.” 
[Interviewee #13].  
6. Everybody does it. The ‘everybody does it’ 
technique involves a “transfer of responsibility from the 
offender to a large and often vaguely defined group to 
which he or she belongs” [54]. As such, this technique 
is commonly used when an offender tries to avoid self-
blame by pointing out that others engage in the same 
activity and that the activity is commonplace and normal 
in a given context [26], [27]. ISS researchers adopting 
this technique in their studies have often referred to it 
with various names, such as ‘defense of ubiquity’ [42] 
or ‘normalization’ [46]. The main point here is that 
using this technique often reflects the argument or 
rationalization that the ISP violation in question is 
commonplace. In the current study, one-third of the 
interviewees used this technique to argue that their 
violation of the ISP was commonly acceptable and 
normal. When discussing rules in general, it was 
emphasized that social acceptability can be more 
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important than what the policy dictates. For instance, 
one interviewee explains “I’m sure there are a lot of 
things that I disagree with [in the policy] because of the 
fact that I don’t think socially anybody is complying with 
it.” [Interviewee #18]. When pressed to clarify their 
rationale further, some would use the personal IT use 
rule to point out: “If you consider basic rule #1 
presented there, I think … that most people around here 
are not aware of such rule, and I also think that if the 
policy has rules that you would think by commonsense 
that 95% of the people are violating–… of course I can't 
say for sure–but I think that everyone here is violating 
basic rule #1 at some time during their work” 
[Interviewee #11].   
7. Matter of mere legality. The ‘matter of mere 
legality’ justification is a previously unknown technique 
of neutralization identified in this study. Nearly half of 
the study participants (eight participant) used this 
technique to justify their ISP violation. Using this 
technique, rule violators argue that a workplace policy 
is merely a matter of contractual agreement and need not 
be followed strictly. The employee may assert this 
position by noting that workplace policies are designed 
for ‘worst case scenarios’ in order to protect the 
organization from legal liabilities in extreme cases, or to 
provide legal grounds for further action against rogue 
employees. In deploying this technique, in addition to 
pointing out the legal qualities of the ISP, participants 
have also noted that the ISP is not a document to 
communicate information security measures and 
guidelines but a legal document that is reserved for gross 
violation or difficult individuals. But for as long as the 
employee is generally careful about not causing any 
harm (see ‘denial of injury’), and doing a generally good 
job (see ‘metaphor of the ledger’), then these ISP rules 
belong only ‘in the drawer’. Surprisingly, this is an 
assumption several interviewees share even without 
knowing what the content of the policy is. One 
participant notes: “I explained I haven't read that 
[pointing to ISP], … and I think without reading that–I 
might be wrong, of course–I think this manual is 10 
pages that liberate the [employer] or whoever wrote 
that, from the, hmm, let's say, the legal side of things, if 
someone does something wrong on purpose. It wasn't 
written for the employee … hmm, the purpose of that 
document is not to help the employees to do stuff, like, 
in secure way; it's just something that's required 
legally”. [Interviewee #2]. Similarly, Interviewee #18 
explains: “If you are in a situation with an employee 
where the employee becomes difficult, you can always 
say: Okey, there’s this policy, you’re supposed to have 
read it”, and then punitive action can be easily taken 
against the trouble-maker. More interestingly, the 
‘matter of mere legality’ justification does not reflect 
disgruntlement against the policy; rather, it reflects a 
general understanding that this is how policies should be 
written, but for legal purposes only. Interviewee #10 
expresses this idea well: “Yeah. I understand why these 
have to be here. I really do. But, nowadays, and more 
specifically within this environment, it's really for the 
purposes of them being able to getting us legally. 
Because we roughly know what we're doing.” In fact, 
Interviewee #17 thought that if they were asked to write 
a policy, they would write it in that exact same way, but 
that does not mean that they would not violate it!    
8. Defense of uniqueness. The ‘defense of 
uniqueness’ is a newly identified technique of 
neutralization in this study. Nearly half of the study 
participants (eight participant) used this technique to 
justify their ISP violation. Using this technique, a policy 
violator questions the contextual relevance of the policy 
and argues that certain policies are not applicable to the 
setting in which the violation occurs. In doing this, the 
violator raises the issue that the setting has unique 
qualities that make certain rules inapplicable in that 
setting while drawing comparison with other settings in 
which the rule applies. Although this technique involves 
a comparative process like the ‘justification by 
comparison’ technique; what we identified here is 
different. Specifically, whereas the ‘justification by 
comparison’ is violation-oriented (i.e., the violation in 
question is not as bad when compared with much worse 
ones); the ‘defense of uniqueness’ is context-oriented 
(i.e., the rule in question may be suitable to other 
contexts, but not ours). Participants in this study used 
this technique to differentiate between their line of work 
with others, either in the same organization or in other 
organizations. Furthermore, in some cases they directly 
argued that the ISP is not applicable to them due to the 
nature of their work. One interviewee explains their 
general view regarding the contextual relevance of 
rules: “I've worked in a number of different 
organizations with different levels of education. You get 
a lot of a**holes out there who, hmm, who would do 
what they want, and take the f*ck what they want, and 
don't give a sh*t about the consequences. These are 
what these rules are there for. But [here], we're all 
generally a decent punch of people.” [Interviewee #10] 
When talking specifically about the personal IT use rule, 
another interviewee gives a more specific explanation 
for the violation: “… I understand if I work in an 
organization that is very, like military, or something like 
that, I understand that I'm not allowed to do my personal 
stuff by my working computer, or through the network 
of that organization. But here, hmm, … I don't do 
anything like that, hmm. So my work is not related to 
anything that should be so secure that I can't use my 
work computer to read my emails.” [Interviewee #14]. 
9. I follow my own rules. ‘I follow my own rules’ 
is the third newly identified technique which reflects the 
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argument that a violator has enough knowledge and/or 
expertise to decide which rules to follow, and which to 
bypass. This also reflects an awareness that not all rules 
are equal; some are meant to be broken. Nearly half of 
the study participants (eight participant) used this 
technique to justify their ISP violation. By using this 
technique, the violator argues that they have developed 
their own set of rules, some of them will be compliant 
with the ISP, but some others may coincidentally violate 
it. Our participants used this technique when justifying 
their disregard for the official ISP, and that it is enough 
to follow their own rules. For instance, Interviewee #4 
explains that it once crossed their mind to check the ISP, 
but eventually decided not to. When they were asked to 
explain why they think they did so, they replied: “Why 
do I think I do that? … Because I have my own judgment 
of what might be good and what might be bad, hahaha” 
[Interviewee #4]. Interestingly, the ‘I follow my own 
rules’ seems to require proof of past success. That is, 
those rules that end up in the employee’s own 
internalized ‘rule-set’ are the ones that have so far been 
effective in keeping them out of trouble. One 
interviewee points out: “I'll follow my own habit, 
because I think it has been quite successful thus far” 
[Interviewee #12]. When another was asked to elaborate 
on how they developed their own rules; they replied: 
“It's taken maybe 15 years to come up with the 
standards that I have now. When it all started? I don't 
really know. Perhaps one of the aspects is like watching 
people do their stuff, and someone saying that ‘you 
should have a strong password’ or ‘you shouldn't leave 
these computers open’ ... to be blunt, those 10 pages I 
haven't read, like I said, but I think it's gonna be 10 
pages of common-sense.” [Interviewee #2]. 
5. Discussion  
In the previous section we presented our main 
findings regarding the neutralization techniques our 
study participants used to justify violating ISP in a 
Nordic university context. Next, we discuss the most 
salient theoretical and practical implications of these 
findings.  
5.1. Theoretical implications  
First, our findings contribute to the depth of 
knowledge on neutralization theory in activities related 
to information security. While there is a sizeable 
literature on neutralization theory in ISS research, much 
of this research has been conducted using a quantitative 
cross-sectional research design and little has been done 
to explore users’ justification for real violations in real 
contexts. In fact, with a few exceptions [46], [55], we 
have not found any studies that examined employees’ 
justifications in response to their workplace policy 
violations. This study steps up to this challenge and in 
doing so provides insights regarding the use of 
neutralization techniques in ISS context. Sykes and 
Matza [6] have acknowledge that neutralization 
techniques are context-specific, meaning that some 
techniques might be more (or less) relevant in certain 
contexts. Our findings lend support to the assertion that 
the techniques ‘denial of responsibility’, ‘denial of 
injury’ and ‘condemnation of the condemners’ are the 
most prevalent classical techniques. Meanwhile, some 
techniques such as ‘denial of the victim’ [6], though a 
classical technique, might be less relevant in similar 
contexts. In this regard, our findings are in line with 
Siponen and Vance’s [8] contention that the ‘denial of 
victim’ neutralization technique might be irrelevant in 
ISP violation cases due to the difficulty of identifying 
victims. Our findings, therefore, highlight the need for 
further explorative studies in other ISS related activities 
such as computer abuse, shadow IT use and 
cyberloafing to determine which techniques may or may 
not be relevant to each activity.  
Second, this study contributes to neutralization 
theory by identifying three previously unknown 
neutralization techniques, namely, ‘matter of mere 
legality’, ‘I follow my own rules’, and ‘defense of 
uniqueness’. These newly identified techniques seem to 
be associated with distinctive qualities of ISPs. The 
‘matter of mere legality’ technique highlights the 
juxtaposition of ISPs as legal documents as well as tools 
for communicating security do’s and don’ts [56]. The 
‘defense of uniqueness’ technique, on the other hand, 
addresses the context-specificity of the work 
environment. Since organizations have different needs 
and different working climates, an ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach to ISPs may not be ideal [57]. Lastly, the ‘I 
follow my own rules’ technique underscores the 
importance of recognizing individual competence and 
personal experience. ISPs may contain information that 
requires high competence and skill to implement [58]. 
The caveat, however, is that when an individual 
possesses such competence and experience, they may 
develop their own ways of handling information 
security and fall into a false sense of confidence 
regarding their own abilities hence rejecting ISPs as 
helpful communication tools. Alternatively, employees’ 
own rules might be more attuned to the specificity of 
their situation, than the policy. In such situations, we are 
faced with a dilemma: what needs correction, the 
employee’s behavior or the policy? Answering this 
question points to our third theoretical implication.  
This dilemma carries within, a value judgement 
regarding the adequacy of the neutralizations. If the 
neutralization is adequate, then employees’ behaviors 
need not be corrected, which means that our attention 
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should be placed on changing the policy itself. So far, 
research based on neutralization theory has not 
addressed this question, which not only does it bear 
theoretical implications, but also practical implications 
(see, practical implications section). Sykes and Matza 
[6] were well aware of this dilemma and hinted to some 
direction for resolving it. Specifically, Sykes and Matza 
[6] contemplated the question “why men violate the 
laws in which they believe” [6, p. 666]. To answer this, 
they point to “the fact that social rules and norms … 
seldom if ever take the form of categorical imperatives” 
(ibid), and because of this contextual flexibility, they 
argue, any functioning legal system deliberates about 
the “defenses to crimes” before giving a verdict 
regarding a given act. Of course, in many situations, the 
justice system deems justifications inadequate, and 
corrective measures need to be taken. However, in some 
situations, even what is generally regarded as mala in 
se, or evil-by-nature crimes [59], [60], such as killing a 
human being, are acquitted because they were ‘justified’ 
(e.g., in self-defense). Yet, in other situations, certain 
rules had to be challenged and violated before any law 
itself needed to change. Interestingly, despite Matza and 
Sykes’ [6] recognition of this assumption, it has not 
attracted scholarly attention, leading Maruna and Copes, 
half-a-century later, to remind us that “the treatment of 
neutralization techniques as automatically ‘bad things’ 
in criminology and corrections is an oversimplification 
of a complex and substantial body of literature” [15, p. 
228]. In line with these insights, we suggest 
neutralizations should be regarded as provisional pleas 
until a verdict is made. The practical implications of this 
insight will be discussed in the next section. 
5.2. Practical implications  
There are two challenges related to the production 
of meaningful practical implications: (a) the degree of 
violation-specificity, and (b) the degree of context-
specificity. Degree of violation-specificity regards one’s 
perception of the ISP as a collection of rules and 
guidelines rather than a single entity. We learned early 
on that the participants did not perceive the ISP as a 
single entity guiding their security behavior. Nearly all 
our interviewees have been complying with some ISP 
rules but violating one or more other rules. For instance, 
one interviewee might be unyielding about password 
sharing (complying with password rule) but using the 
work computer to pay personal bills or read the news 
(violating the personal IT use rule). Practically 
speaking, when employees are asked general questions 
about the extent to which they comply with or violate 
ISP (in general), it is impossible to discern which 
neutralization techniques are relevant to which 
violation. So, we fear that using such generic questions 
will not produce meaningful insights to security 
professionals and consultants regarding what the 
employees are actually doing in the workplace. 
Consequently, we suggest that future explorations of 
ISP violations to be narrower in their scope to be more 
practice-relevant [61].  
Second, regarding the degree of context-specificity, 
we realized a critical practical dilemma, even after 
narrowing the scope of violation-specificity to one 
specific rule. During the course of each interview after 
going through general discussions regarding the ISP, 
each participant was confronted with a rule from the ISP 
(such as basic rule #1). As noted earlier, this basic rule 
bars users from all non-work related use. Approaching 
and analyzing participants’ responses to such rules 
without due consideration of context using the 
neutralization theory indicated clear use of various 
neutralization techniques from a ‘context-less 
perspective’. Prohibiting all non-work related use of the 
organization resources is justified by countless writings 
on the threats of such violation. Not only does personal 
use of IT expose the organization to various security 
threat such as viruses, spam, and malware [62], but also 
introduces loss of productivity [12].  
These concerns are legitimate, and therefore the 
obvious recommendation of a context-less perspective 
would be to curb the violations by developing counter-
neutralization strategies tailored to the specific 
techniques we identified. Regarding the ‘condemnation 
of the condemners’ technique, a typical 
recommendation is to suggest anti-neutralization 
communication, and training aimed at correcting the 
employees’ behavior by creating cognitive 
inconsistencies between what they do and the 
justifiability of their rationalizations [13], [14], [16]. 
Following this line of thought, a practical 
recommendation would be developing training and 
persuasive messages to teach the learners that criticizing 
the ISP is not acceptable (a generic approach), or that it 
is an immoral thing to do to use the organization 
resources for personal use (a more specific approach). 
Regarding the ‘matter of mere legality’ technique, a 
straightforward practical recommendation is the 
enforcement of monitoring and immediate sanctioning 
of violators to demonstrate the seriousness of the ISP 
[63]. Other technique-specific solutions are available, 
such as victim-offender mediation which is thought to 
be effective with the ‘denial of injury’ technique [8].  
However, considering the specific nature of the 
studied context, one might see things differently. In this 
specific research-oriented environment where 
employees believe that creativity and openness are core 
values, and where the line between what they do at work 
and at home is thinning, there is good chance that the 
neutralizations identified in this research need not be de-
Page 6819
neutralized. There might be truth (i.e., adequacy) to the 
argument that strict adherence to the ISP regarding 
personal IT use would hinder, rather than improve, the 
functioning of this specific organization, especially that 
the security risk associated with personal IT use does not 
outweigh its benefits in the studied organization. In fact, 
the thinning line between work and home and the 
necessity of managerial attention to this issue before 
resorting to de-neutralization is recognized in previous 
literature [46]. Consequently, we suggest that 
practitioners observe employees justifications with 
diligence as utterances of employees may reflect their 
tacit knowledge of the work environment, task 
requirements, or deficiencies in the ISP; rather than 
(bad) neutralizations that help them evade 
accountability [15]. For instance, in our study, ‘defense 
of uniqueness’ and ‘matter of mere legality’ techniques 
were commonly used justifications. While these 
justifications could reflect of employees’ neutralization 
of security misbehaviors, it might also reflect a 
deficiency in the design of the ISP with respect to its 
relevance and contextual fit. The ISP may in fact require 
correcting and updating. In this case, ‘following own 
rules’ might have been a good neutralization after all.  
6. Conclusion  
The objective of this study has been to explore the 
employees’ perspective regarding their workplace ISP 
violation. The guiding research question has been ‘how 
do employees justify violating the ISP’? Our analysis 
reveals the prevalence of nine neutralization techniques 
used by our participants to justify their ISP violations. 
Three of these techniques were introduced in the 
original work neutralization theory, ‘denial of injury’, 
‘denial of responsibility’, and ‘condemnation of the 
condemners’. Three techniques were introduced by later 
research extensions, namely, ‘defense of necessity’, 
‘justification by comparison’ and ‘everybody does it’. 
In addition to these six previously recognized 
techniques, our analysis also revealed three novel and 
previously unreported neutralization techniques. We 
called them: ‘matter of mere legality’, ‘defense of 
uniqueness’, and ‘I follow my own rules’. Our findings 
add to the depth and breadth of knowledge regarding 
application of neutralization theory in the context of ISS 
by introducing new techniques of neutralization while 
highlighting the most significant techniques that require 
practitioner attention. But more importantly, our 
findings point to the danger of taking these 
neutralizations out of context, since without context, it 
becomes impossible to judge whether the behavior, or 
the rule, needs correcting. 
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